

# Identification Schemes from Key Encapsulation Mechanisms

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**Abstract.** We propose a generic way for deriving an identification (ID) scheme secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks from a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) secure against chosen ciphertext attacks on one-wayness (one-way-CCA). Then we give a concrete one-way-CCA secure KEM based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. In that construction, the Twin Diffie-Hellman technique of Cash, Kiltz and Shoup is essentially employed. We compare efficiency of the ID scheme derived from our KEM with previously known ID schemes and KEMs. It turns out that our KEM-based ID scheme reduces the computation by one exponentiation than the currently most efficient one derived from the Hanaoka-Kurosawa one-way-CCA secure KEM, whose security is based on the same (CDH) assumption.

**Keywords:** identification scheme, key encapsulation mechanism, one-way-CCA security, concurrent man-in-the-middle attack, the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.

## 1 Introduction

An identification (ID) scheme enables a prover to convince a verifier that the prover is indeed itself by proving that it knows some secret information. In the public key framework, a prover holds a secret key and a verifier refers to a matching public key. They interact for some rounds doing necessary computations until the verifier feels certain that the prover has the secret key. The secret key is never revealed directly but hidden in messages through those computations.

Historically, there have been two types of ID schemes. One is challenge-and-response type obtained in a natural way from encryption schemes or signature schemes, and the other is the  $\Sigma$ -protocol type [7] which is a kind of proofs of knowledge [12, 4] consisting of 3-round interaction. Most of known traditional ID schemes, such as the Schnorr scheme [24] and the Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) scheme [13], are the  $\Sigma$ -protocol type because they are faster than challenge-and-response type.

Now in the Internet environment where everyone is involved, attacks on ID schemes have become fairly strong. One of the strongest is *concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks*. In concurrent man-in-the-middle setting, an adversary stands between a verifier and a prover, and the adversary invokes many instances of the prover application (prover clones), which have independent states and random tapes. Interacting in some cheating way, the adversary collects information of the secret key from the prover clones, while the adversary interacts with the verifier simultaneously trying to impersonate the prover.

Unfortunately, the Schnorr scheme and the GQ scheme are not secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks, hence there have been significant efforts to make

ID schemes have tolerance against such concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks based on the  $\Sigma$ -protocol. For example, Katz [16] made an ID scheme of non-malleable proof of knowledge. But the security model is with timing constraint, not against full concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks. Moreover, the protocol utilizes the so-called OR-Proof technique, so it is a little bit costly. Gennaro [11] constructed an ID scheme of (fully) concurrently non-malleable proof of knowledge employing a multi-trapdoor commitment. But it is no longer so fast as a challenge-and-response ID scheme obtained, for instance, from the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [8]. Moreover, the security is based on a strong type of assumption (the Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) assumption or the Strong RSA assumption).

One of the reason why it is so difficult to construct an ID scheme secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks seems that we are rooted in the category of  $\Sigma$ -protocols. Let us remember that challenge-and-response ID schemes obtained from IND-CCA secure encryption schemes (see [8] for example) and EUF-CMA secure signature schemes (see [2] for example) are already secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks.

## 1.1 Our Contribution

In the notion of encryption scheme, key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) is the foundational concept for hybrid construction with data encryption mechanism. As a first contribution in this paper, we propose to use KEM as ID scheme analogous to the usage of encryption scheme. That is, given a KEM, we derive a challenge-and-response ID scheme as follows. A verifier of a KEM-based ID scheme makes a pair of random string and its ciphertext using a public key, and send the ciphertext as a challenge to the prover having the matching secret key. The prover decapsulates the ciphertext and returns the result as a response. The verifier checks whether or not the response is equal to the random string. Although this is a straightforward conversion, it has never been mentioned in the literature, to the best of our knowledge.

As a generic property, KEM-based ID scheme has an advantage over (non-hybrid) encryption-based ID scheme. That is, KEM only has to encapsulate *random* strings and may generate them by itself, while encryption scheme has to encrypt *any* strings given as input. Consequently, KEM-based ID scheme has a possibility to have simpler and more efficient protocol than encryption-based ID scheme.

In addition, as we will show in Section 3, KEM only need to be one-way-CCA secure for derived ID scheme to have security against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks (cMiM security). In other words, IND-CCA security, which is stronger than one-way-CCA security, is rather excessive for deriving cMiM secure ID scheme. Nonetheless by this time, most known encryption schemes and KEMs have been designed to possess IND-CCA security (because the purpose is not to make up ID schemes, of course).

Hence there arises a need to provide one-way-CCA secure KEMs. As a second contribution, we give a concrete, discrete-logarithm-based one-way-CCA secure KEM. It is true that there have already been a few one-way-CCA secure KEMs in discrete-logarithm setting. In contrast to those KEMs, the feature of our KEM is that it needs the smallest

amount of computational cost while its security is based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption which is weaker than the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption or the Gap-CDH assumption (see [21] for these assumptions). That feature is achieved by applying the Twin Diffie-Hellman technique [6] to Anada-Arita’s scheme [1] to relax the Gap-CDH assumption on which their scheme is based<sup>1</sup>.

Finally, we point out a feature that the prover in our generic construction of ID scheme is deterministic, and hence the derived ID scheme is prover-resetable [3]. Moreover, they are also verifier-resetable because they consists of 2-round interaction. This is a remarkable property because, as is discussed by Yilek [27], resetable security is crucially helpful for virtual machine service in the Cloud Computing, for example.

## 1.2 Related Works

Recently, independently of us, Fujisaki [10] pointed out a fact similar to our generic construction above (that is, the conversion from one-way-CCA secure KEM to cMiM secure ID scheme). We discuss the conversion more precisely than it.

As for concrete constructions, the IND-CCA secure KEM of Shoup [25], which is naturally a one-way-CCA secure KEM, performs comparably efficiently even now, while its security is based on the DDH assumption. Hanaoka-Kurosawa [15] gave a one-way-CCA secure KEM whose assumption is the CDH assumption, which is weaker than the DDH assumption. It is directly comparable with our KEM and our KEM reduces the computation by one exponentiation for encapsulation than the Hanaoka-Kurosawa KEM. While both the Shoup KEM and the Hanaoka-Kurosawa KEM are intended for the hybrid encryption construction, the one-way-CCA secure KEM of Anada-Arita [1] is intended directly for ID scheme. It performs better than Shoup’s KEM and its security is based on the Gap-CDH assumption. The Twin Diffie-Hellman technique enables us to relax that gap assumption to lead our one-way-CCA secure KEM.

## 1.3 Organization of the Paper

In Section 2, we fix some notations and briefly review the notion of ID scheme, KEM and computational hardness assumption. In Section 3, we propose a generic way for deriving a cMiM secure ID scheme from a one-way-CCA secure KEM. In Section 4, we construct a one-way-CCA secure KEM by the Twin Diffie-Hellman technique. In Section 5, we compare our KEM or ID scheme with previously known KEMs or ID schemes. In Section 6, we conclude our work.

## 2 Preliminaries

The security parameter is denoted  $k$ . On input  $1^k$ , a PPT algorithm  $\text{Grp}$  runs and outputs  $(q, g)$ , where  $q$  is a prime of length  $k$  and  $g$  is a generator of a multiplicative cyclic group  $G_q$  of order  $q$ .  $\text{Grp}$  specifies elements and group operations of  $G_q$ . The ring

<sup>1</sup> The strategy to apply the Twin Diffie-Hellman technique was suggested to us by Prof. Kiltz [18].

of exponent domain of  $G_q$ , which consists of integers from 0 to  $q - 1$  with modulo  $q$  operation, is denoted  $\mathbf{Z}_q$ .

When an algorithm  $A$  on input  $a$  outputs  $z$ , we denote it as  $z \leftarrow A(a)$ . When  $A$  on input  $a$  and  $B$  on input  $b$  interact and  $B$  outputs  $z$ , we denote it as  $z \leftarrow \langle A(a), B(b) \rangle$ . When  $A$  has oracle-access to  $\mathcal{O}$ , we denote it as  $A^{\mathcal{O}}$ . When  $A$  has concurrent oracle-access to  $n$  oracles  $\mathcal{O}_1, \dots, \mathcal{O}_n$ , we denote it as  $A^{\mathcal{O}_1 | \dots | \mathcal{O}_n}$ . Here “concurrent” means that  $A$  accesses to oracles in arbitrarily interleaved order of messages.

A probability of an event  $X$  is denoted  $\Pr[X]$ . A probability of an event  $X$  on conditions  $Y_1, \dots, Y_m$  is denoted  $\Pr[Y_1; \dots; Y_m : X]$ .

## 2.1 Identification Scheme

An *identification scheme*  $ID$  is a triple of PPT algorithms  $(K, P, V)$ .  $K$  is a key generator which outputs a pair of a public key and a matching secret key  $(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk})$  on input  $1^k$ .  $P$  and  $V$  implement a prover and a verifier strategy, respectively. We require  $ID$  to satisfy the completeness condition that boolean decision by  $V(\mathbf{pk})$  after interaction with  $P(\mathbf{sk})$  is TRUE with probability one. We say that  $V(\mathbf{pk})$  *accepts* if its boolean decision is TRUE.

**Concurrent Man-in-the-Middle Attack on Identification Scheme [3, 5]** The aim of an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that attacks an ID scheme  $ID$  is impersonation. We say that  $\mathcal{A}$  *wins* when  $\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{pk})$  succeeds in making  $V(\mathbf{pk})$  accept.

An adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  performs concurrent man-in-the-middle (cMiM, for short) attack in the following way.

**Experiment** $_{\mathcal{A}, ID}^{\text{imp-cmim}}(1^k)$

$(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk}) \leftarrow K(1^k)$ , decision  $\leftarrow \langle \mathcal{A}^{P_1(\mathbf{sk}) | \dots | P_n(\mathbf{sk})}(\mathbf{pk}), V(\mathbf{pk}) \rangle$

If decision = 1  $\wedge$   $\pi^* \notin \{\pi_i\}_{i=1}^n$  then return WIN else return LOSE.

In the above experiment, we denoted a transcript of interaction between  $P_i(\mathbf{sk})$  and  $\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{pk})$  as  $\pi_i$  and a transcript between  $\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{pk})$  and  $V(\mathbf{pk})$  as  $\pi^*$ . As a rule, man-in-the-middle adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  is prohibited from relaying a transcript of a whole interaction with some prover clone to the verifier  $V(\mathbf{pk})$ , as is described  $\pi^* \notin \{\pi_i\}_{i=1}^n$  in the experiment. This is a standard and natural constraint to keep man-in-the-middle attack meaningful.

We define  $\mathcal{A}$ 's *imp-cMiM advantage over ID* as:

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, ID}^{\text{imp-cmim}}(k) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[\mathbf{Experiment}_{\mathcal{A}, ID}^{\text{imp-cmim}}(1^k) \text{ returns WIN}].$$

We say that an ID is secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks (cMiM secure, for short) if, for any PPT algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, ID}^{\text{imp-cmim}}(k)$  is negligible in  $k$ .

Suppose that an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  consists of two algorithms  $\mathcal{A}_1$  and  $\mathcal{A}_2$ . The following experiment is called a 2-phase concurrent attack.

**Experiment** $_{\mathcal{A}, ID}^{\text{imp-2pc}}(1^k)$

$(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk}) \leftarrow K(1^k)$ ,  $st \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{P_1(\mathbf{sk}) | \dots | P_n(\mathbf{sk})}(\mathbf{pk})$ , decision  $\leftarrow \langle \mathcal{A}_2(st), V(\mathbf{pk}) \rangle$

If decision = 1 then return WIN else return LOSE.

2-phase concurrent attack is a weaker model than cMiM attack because of the constraint that the learning phase of  $\mathcal{A}_1$  is limited to before the impersonation phase of  $\mathcal{A}_2$ .

2-phase concurrent attack and cMiM attack are classified to active attacks. On the contrary, there is a passive attack described below. Let us denote a transcript of a whole interaction between  $\mathsf{P}(\mathbf{sk})$  and  $\mathsf{V}(\mathbf{pk})$  as  $\pi = |\langle \mathsf{P}(\mathbf{sk}), \mathsf{V}(\mathbf{pk}) \rangle|$ .

**Experiment** $_{\mathcal{A}, \text{ID}}^{\text{imp-pa}}(1^k)$

$(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}(1^k)$

If  $\mathcal{A}_1(\mathbf{pk})$  makes a query, reply  $\pi_i \leftarrow |\langle \mathsf{P}(\mathbf{sk}), \mathsf{V}(\mathbf{pk}) \rangle|$

$st \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(\{\pi_i\}_{i=1}^n)$ , decision  $\leftarrow \langle \mathcal{A}_2(st), \mathsf{V}(\mathbf{pk}) \rangle$

If decision = 1 then return WIN else return LOSE.

Passive attack is a weaker model than 2-phase concurrent attack because of the constraint that  $\mathcal{A}$  cannot choose messages in the learning phase.

## 2.2 Key Encapsulation Mechanism

A *key encapsulation mechanism (KEM)*  $KEM$  is a triple of PPT algorithms  $(\mathsf{K}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ .  $\mathsf{K}$  is a key generator which outputs a pair of a public key and a matching secret key  $(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk})$  on input  $1^k$ .  $\mathsf{Enc}$  is an encapsulation algorithm which, on input  $\mathbf{pk}$ , outputs a pair  $(K, \psi)$ , where  $K$  is a random string and  $\psi$  is a ciphertext of  $K$ .  $\mathsf{Dec}$  is a decapsulation algorithm which, on input  $(\mathbf{sk}, \psi)$ , outputs the decapsulation  $\widehat{K}$  of  $\psi$ . We require  $KEM$  to satisfy the completeness condition that the decapsulation  $\widehat{K}$  of a consistently generated ciphertext  $\psi$  by  $\mathsf{Enc}$  is equal to the original random string  $K$  with probability one.

**Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack on One-Wayness of KEM [22, 15]** An adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  on a KEM performs adaptive chosen ciphertext attack on one-wayness of a KEM (one-way-CCA, for short) in the following way.

**Experiment** $_{\mathcal{A}, \text{KEM}}^{\text{ow-cca}}(1^k)$

$(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}(1^k)$ ,  $(K^*, \psi^*) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathbf{pk})$ ,  $\widehat{K}^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{D}\mathcal{E}\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{sk}, \cdot)}(\mathbf{pk}, \psi^*)$

If  $\widehat{K}^* = K^* \wedge \psi^* \notin \{\psi_i\}_{i=1}^{q_{dec}}$  then return WIN else return LOSE.

In the above experiment,  $\psi_i, i = 1, \dots, q_{dec}$  mean ciphertexts for which  $\mathcal{A}$  queries its decapsulation oracle  $\mathcal{D}\mathcal{E}\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{sk}, \cdot)$  for the answer. Here the number  $q_{dec}$  of queries is polynomially many in  $k$ . The challenge ciphertext  $\psi^*$  itself must not be queried to  $\mathcal{D}\mathcal{E}\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{sk}, \cdot)$ , as is described  $\psi^* \notin \{\psi_i\}_{i=1}^{q_{dec}}$  in the experiment.

We define  $\mathcal{A}$ 's *one-way-CCA advantage over KEM* as:

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{KEM}}^{\text{ow-cca}}(k) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[\mathbf{Experiment}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{KEM}}^{\text{ow-cca}}(1^k) \text{ returns WIN}].$$

We say that a KEM is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks against one-wayness (one-way-CCA secure, for short) if, for any PPT algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{KEM}}^{\text{ow-cca}}(k)$

is negligible in  $k$ . Note that if a KEM is IND-CCA secure [8], then it is one-way-CCA secure. So IND-CCA security is a stronger notion than one-way-CCA security.

Suppose that an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  consists of two algorithms  $\mathcal{A}_1$  and  $\mathcal{A}_2$ . The following experiment is called a non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack on one-wayness of a KEM.

**Experiment** $_{\mathcal{A}, \text{KEM}}^{\text{ow-cca1}}(1^k)$

$(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{K}(1^k), st \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\text{DEC}(\text{sk}, \cdot)}(\text{pk}), (K^*, \psi^*) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}), \widehat{K}^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(st, \psi^*)$

If  $\widehat{K}^* = K^*$  then return WIN else return LOSE.

Non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack is a weaker model than adaptive one because of the constraint that the learning phase of  $\mathcal{A}_1$  is limited to before the solving phase of  $\mathcal{A}_2$ .

Adaptive and non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks are classified to active attacks. On the contrary, there is a passive attack on one-wayness of a KEM described below.

**Experiment** $_{\mathcal{A}, \text{KEM}}^{\text{ow-pa}}(1^k)$

$(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{K}(1^k)$

If  $\mathcal{A}_1(\text{pk})$  makes a query, reply  $(K_i, \psi_i) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk})$

$st \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(\{(K_i, \psi_i)\}_{i=1}^n), (K^*, \psi^*) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}), \widehat{K}^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(st, \psi^*)$

If  $\widehat{K}^* = K^*$  then return WIN else return LOSE.

Passive attack is a weaker model than non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack because of the constraint that  $\mathcal{A}$  cannot choose ciphertexts in the learning phase.

### 2.3 The Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption and the Twin Diffie-Hellman Technique

We say a solver  $\mathcal{S}$ , a PPT algorithm, *wins* when  $\mathcal{S}$  succeeds in solving a computational problem instance.

A quadruple  $(g, X, Y, Z)$  of elements in  $G_q$  is called a *Diffie-Hellman tuple* (DH tuple, for short) if the quadruple is written as  $(g, g^x, g^y, g^{xy})$  for some elements  $x, y$  in  $\mathbf{Z}_q$ . A CDH problem instance is a triple  $(g, X = g^x, Y = g^y)$ , where the exponents  $x, y$  are uniformly random in  $\mathbf{Z}_q$ . A CDH problem solver is a PPT algorithm which, given a CDH problem instance  $(g, X, Y)$  as input, tries to return  $Z = g^{xy}$ , whose experiment is the following.

**Experiment** $_{\mathcal{S}, \text{Grp}}^{\text{cdh}}(1^k)$

$(g, g) \leftarrow \text{Grp}(1^k), x, y \leftarrow \mathbf{Z}_q, X := g^x, Y := g^y, Z \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(g, X, Y)$

If  $Z = g^{xy}$  then return WIN else return LOSE.

We define  $\mathcal{S}$ 's CDH advantage over  $\text{Grp}$  as:

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{S}, \text{Grp}}^{\text{cdh}}(k) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[\text{Experiment}_{\mathcal{S}, \text{Grp}}^{\text{cdh}}(1^k) \text{ returns WIN}].$$

We say that the CDH assumption [21] holds for  $\text{Grp}$  if, for any PPT algorithm  $\mathcal{S}$ ,  $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{S}, \text{Grp}}^{\text{cdh}}(k)$  is negligible in  $k$ .

A 6-tuple  $(g, X_1, X_2, Y, Z_1, Z_2)$  of elements in  $G_q$  is called a *twin Diffie-Hellman tuple* if the tuple is written as  $(g, g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, g^y, g^{x_1 y}, g^{x_2 y})$  for some elements  $x_1, x_2, y$  in  $\mathbf{Z}_q$ .

The following lemma of Cash, Kiltz and Shoup is used in Section 4 to decide whether or not a tuple is a twin DH tuple in the security proof for our concrete KEM.

**Lemma (Cash, Kiltz and Shoup [6] Theorem 2, “Trap Door Test”)** *Let  $X_1, r, s$  be mutually independent random variables, where  $X_1$  takes values in  $G_q$ , and each of  $r, s$  is uniformly distributed over  $\mathbf{Z}_q$ . Define the random variable  $X_2 := X_1^{-r} g^s$ . Suppose that  $\widehat{Y}, \widehat{Z}_1, \widehat{Z}_2$  are random variables taking values in  $G_q$ , each of which is defined independently of  $r$ . Then the probability that the truth value of  $\widehat{Z}_1^r \widehat{Z}_2 = \widehat{Y}^s$  does not agree with the truth value of  $(g, X_1, X_2, \widehat{Y}, \widehat{Z}_1, \widehat{Z}_2)$  being a twin DH tuple is at most  $1/q$ . Moreover, if  $(g, X_1, X_2, \widehat{Y}, \widehat{Z}_1, \widehat{Z}_2)$  is a twin DH tuple, then  $\widehat{Z}_1^r \widehat{Z}_2 = \widehat{Y}^s$  certainly holds.*

### 3 Identification Scheme from Key Encapsulation Mechanism

In this section, we show a generic way for deriving an ID scheme secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks from a one-way-CCA secure KEM.


#### 3.1 Construction

Let  $\text{KEM} = (\text{K}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$  be a KEM. Then an ID scheme ID is derived in a natural way as shown in the Fig.1. The key generation algorithm is the same as that of KEM. The verifier  $V$ , given a public key  $\text{pk}$  as input, invokes the encapsulation algorithm  $\text{Enc}$  on  $\text{pk}$  and gets its output  $(K, \psi)$ .  $V$  sends  $\psi$  to  $P$ . The prover  $P$ , given a secret key  $\text{sk}$  as input and receiving  $\psi$  as input message, invokes the decapsulation algorithm  $\text{Dec}$  on  $(\text{sk}, \psi)$  and gets its output  $\widehat{K}$ .  $P$  sends  $\widehat{K}$  to  $V$ . Finally the verifier  $V$ , receiving  $\widehat{K}$  as input message, verifies whether or not  $\widehat{K}$  is equal to  $K$ . If so, then  $V$  returns 1 and otherwise, 0.

It is notable that, if we use an encryption scheme, which is not a KEM, as an ID scheme in a similar way, then we need to *input* a random string into the encryption algorithm. In contrast, in a KEM, an encapsulation algorithm does not need such an input but only has to *output* a random string.

**Theorem 1** *If a key encapsulation mechanism KEM is one-way-CCA secure, then the derived identification scheme ID is cMiM secure. More precisely, for any PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that attacks ID in cMiM setting, there exists an PPT adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  that attacks KEM in one-way-CCA setting satisfying the following inequality.*

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{ID}}^{\text{imp-cmim}}(k) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}, \text{KEM}}^{\text{ow-cca}}(k).$$



**Fig. 1.** An ID scheme  $\text{ID}=(\text{K},\text{P},\text{V})$  derived from a KEM  $\text{KEM}=(\text{K},\text{Enc},\text{Dec})$ .

### 3.2 Proof of Theorem 1


Let KEM be a one-way-CCA secure KEM and ID be the derived ID scheme by the construction above. Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be any given cMiM adversary on ID. Using  $\mathcal{A}$  as subroutine, we construct a PPT one-way-CCA adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  that attacks KEM as shown in the Fig.2.

On input  $\text{pk}$  and the challenge ciphertext  $\psi^*$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  initializes its inner state and invokes  $\mathcal{A}$  on input  $\text{pk}$ .

In case that  $\mathcal{A}$  queries  $\text{V}(\text{pk})$  for the challenge message,  $\mathcal{B}$  sends  $\psi^*$  to  $\mathcal{A}$  as the challenge message.

In case that  $\mathcal{A}$  sends a challenge message  $\psi$  to a prover clone  $\text{P}(\text{sk})$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  checks whether or not  $\psi$  is equal to  $\psi^*$ . If so, then  $\mathcal{B}$  puts  $K = \perp$ . Otherwise,  $\mathcal{B}$  queries its decapsulation oracle  $\text{DEC}(\text{sk}, \cdot)$  for the answer for the ciphertext  $\psi$  and gets  $K$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  sends  $K$  to  $\mathcal{A}$  as the response message.

In case that  $\mathcal{A}$  sends the response message  $\widehat{K}^*$  to  $\text{V}(\text{pk})$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  returns  $\widehat{K}^*$  as the answer for the challenge ciphertext  $\psi^*$ .



**Fig. 2.** A one-way-CCA adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  employing a cMiM adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  for the proof of Theorem 1.

The view of  $\mathcal{A}$  in  $\mathcal{B}$  is the same as the real view of  $\mathcal{A}$ . This is obvious except the case that  $\psi$  is equal to  $\psi^*$ . When  $\mathcal{A}$  sent  $\psi = \psi^*$ , the transcript of the interaction between



$\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{sk})$  and  $\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{pk})$  would be wholly equal to that between  $\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{pk})$  and  $\mathcal{V}(\mathbf{pk})$ , because the prover  $\mathcal{P}$  is deterministic. This is ruled out, so  $\mathcal{B}$ 's response,  $K = \perp$ , is appropriate.

If  $\mathcal{A}$  wins, then  $\mathcal{B}$  wins. Hence the inequality in Theorem 1 follows. (*Q.E.D.*)

**Remark 1.** In analogous ways, we can show the following facts. If a KEM is secure against non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks on one-wayness, then the derived ID scheme ID is secure against 2-phase concurrent attacks. If a KEM is secure against passive attacks on one-wayness, then the derived ID scheme ID is secure against passive attacks.

**Remark 2.** The prover  $\mathcal{P}$  in the Fig.1 is deterministic. Therefore, the derived ID scheme ID is prover-resettable [3]. Moreover, ID is also verifier-resettable because ID consists of 2-round interaction.

## 4 A One-Way-CCA Secure KEM Based on the CDH Assumption

In this section, we propose a one-way-CCA secure KEM based on the CDH assumption. The challenge-and-response ID scheme of Anada-Arita [1] can be viewed as a one-way-CCA secure KEM based on the Gap-CDH assumption. Our strategy is to relax the gap assumption by applying the Twin Diffie-Hellman technique of Cash, Kiltz and Shoup [6, 18].

In the construction, we employ a target collision resistant (TCR) hash function family. The definition of a TCR hash function family  $Hfam(1^k) = \{H_\mu\}_{\mu \in Hkey(1^k)}$  and advantage  $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{CF}, Hfam}^{\text{TCR}}(k)$  of a PPT collision finder  $\mathcal{CF}$  over  $Hfam$  are in Appendix A.

### 4.1 Construction

The construction of a KEM KEM1 is shown in the Fig.3.

On input  $1^k$ , the key generator  $\mathcal{K}$  runs as follows. A group generator  $\mathbf{Grp}$  outputs  $(g, g)$  on input  $1^k$ . In addition,  $\mathcal{K}$  chooses a hash key  $\mu$  from a hash key space  $Hkey(1^k)$ . The hash key  $\mu$  indicates a specific hash function  $H_\mu$  with values in  $\mathbf{Z}_q$  in a hash function family  $Hfam(1^k)$ . Then  $\mathcal{K}$  chooses  $x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2 \in \mathbf{Z}_q$  and computes  $X_1 = g^{x_1}, X_2 = g^{x_2}, Y_1 = g^{y_1}, Y_2 = g^{y_2}$ .  $\mathcal{K}$  sets  $\mathbf{pk} = (g, g, X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2, \mu)$  and  $\mathbf{sk} = (g, g, x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, \mu)$ . Then  $\mathcal{K}$  returns  $(\mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk})$ .

On input  $\mathbf{pk}$ , the encapsulation algorithm  $\mathbf{Enc}$  runs as follows.  $\mathbf{Enc}$  chooses  $a \in \mathbf{Z}_q$  at random and computes  $h = g^a$  and the hash value  $\tau \leftarrow H_\mu(h)$ . Then  $\mathbf{Enc}$  computes  $d_1 = (X_1^\tau Y_1)^a, d_2 = (X_2^\tau Y_2)^a$  and  $K = X_1^a$ . The random string is  $K$  and the ciphertext is  $\psi = (h, d_1, d_2)$ . Note here that  $(g, X_1^\tau Y_1, X_2^\tau Y_2, h, d_1, d_2)$  is a twin DH tuple.  $\mathbf{Enc}$  returns the pair  $(K, \psi)$ .

On input  $\mathbf{sk}$  and  $\psi = (h, d_1, d_2)$ , the decapsulation algorithm  $\mathbf{Dec}$  runs as follows.  $\mathbf{Dec}$  computes the hash value  $\tau \leftarrow H_\mu(h)$ . Then  $\mathbf{Dec}$  verifies whether  $\psi = (h, d_1, d_2)$  is a consistent ciphertext, that is, whether  $(g, X_1^\tau Y_1, X_2^\tau Y_2, h, d_1, d_2)$  is a twin DH tuple or not. For this sake,  $\mathbf{Dec}$  checks whether  $h^{\tau x_1 + y_1} = d_1$  and  $h^{\tau x_2 + y_2} = d_2$  hold. If at least one of them does not hold, then  $\mathbf{Dec}$  puts  $K = \perp$ . Otherwise  $\mathbf{Dec}$  computes the decapsulation  $K = h^{x_1}$ . Note that  $(g, X_1, h, K)$  is a DH tuple. Finally,  $\mathbf{Dec}$  returns  $K$ .

<p><b>Key Generation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– K: given <math>1^k</math> as input; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <math>(g, g) \leftarrow \text{Grp}(1^k), \mu \leftarrow \text{Hkey}(1^k)</math></li> <li>• <math>x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2 \leftarrow \mathbf{Z}_q, X_1 := g^{x_1}, X_2 := g^{x_2}, Y_1 := g^{y_1}, Y_2 := g^{y_2}</math></li> <li>• <math>\text{pk} := (g, g, X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2, \mu), \text{sk} := (q, g, x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, \mu)</math></li> <li>• Return <math>(\text{pk}, \text{sk})</math></li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b>Encapsulation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Enc: given <math>\text{pk}</math> as input; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <math>a \leftarrow \mathbf{Z}_q, h := g^a, \tau \leftarrow H_\mu(h)</math></li> <li>• <math>d_1 := (X_1^\tau Y_1)^a, d_2 := (X_2^\tau Y_2)^a, K := X_1^a, \psi = (h, d_1, d_2)</math></li> <li>• Return <math>(K, \psi)</math></li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b>Decapsulation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Dec: given <math>\text{sk}, \psi = (h, d_1, d_2)</math> as input; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <math>\tau \leftarrow H_\mu(h)</math></li> <li>• If <math>h^{\tau x_1 + y_1} \neq d_1</math> or <math>h^{\tau x_2 + y_2} \neq d_2</math> then <math>K := \perp</math> else <math>K := h^{x_1}</math></li> <li>• Return <math>K</math></li> </ul> </li> </ul>
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**Fig. 3.** A one-way-CCA secure KEM KEM1.

**Theorem 2** *The key encapsulation mechanism KEM1 is one-way-CCA secure based on the CDH assumption and the target collision resistance of employed hash function. More precisely, for any PPT one-way-CCA adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  on KEM1 that queries decapsulation oracle at most  $q_{dec}$  times, there exist a PPT CDH problem solver  $\mathcal{S}$  on Grp and a PPT collision-finder  $\mathcal{CF}$  on Hfam which satisfy the following tight reduction.*

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{KEM1}}^{\text{ow-cca}}(k) \leq \frac{q_{dec}}{q} + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{S}, \text{Grp}}^{\text{cdh}}(k) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{CF}, \text{Hfam}}^{\text{tr}}(k).$$

## 4.2 Proof of Theorem 2

Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be any given adversary that attacks KEM1 in one-way-CCA setting. Using  $\mathcal{A}$  as subroutine, we construct a PPT CDH problem solver  $\mathcal{S}$  as shown in the Fig.4, where an algebraic trick [17] and the Twin Diffie-Hellman technique [6] are essentially used.

$\mathcal{S}$  is given  $(g, g), X = g^x$  and  $Y = g^y$  as input, where  $x$  and  $y$  are random.  $\mathcal{S}$  initializes its inner state.  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses  $a^* \in \mathbf{Z}_q$  at random and computes  $h^* = Yg^{a^*}$ . Then  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses  $\mu$  from  $\text{Hkey}(1^k)$  and computes  $\tau^* \leftarrow H_\mu(h^*)$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses  $r, s \in \mathbf{Z}_q$  at random, and puts  $X_1 = X, X_2 = X_1^{-r}g^s$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses  $u_1, u_2 \in \mathbf{Z}_q$  at random, and computes  $W_1 = X_1^{-\tau^*}g^{u_1}, W_2 = X_2^{-\tau^*}g^{u_2}$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  computes  $d_1^* = (h^*)^{u_1}, d_2^* = (h^*)^{u_2}$ .  $\mathcal{S}$  sets  $\text{pk} = (g, g, X_1, X_2, W_1, W_2, \mu), \psi^* = (h^*, d_1^*, d_2^*)$  and invokes  $\mathcal{A}$  on input  $\text{pk}$  and  $\psi^*$ . Note that  $\text{pk}$  is correctly distributed. Note also that  $\mathcal{S}$  does not know  $x_1, x_2, w_1, w_2$  at all, where  $x_1, x_2, w_1, w_2$  are the discrete log of  $X_1, X_2, W_1, W_2$ , respectively. Especially the followings hold.

$$w_i = \log_g(W_i) = -\tau^* x_i + u_i, \quad i = 1, 2. \quad (1)$$

$\mathcal{S}$  replies to  $\mathcal{A}$ 's queries as follows.

In case that  $\mathcal{A}$  queries its decapsulation oracle  $\mathcal{DEC}(\mathbf{sk}, \cdot)$  for the answer for  $\psi = (h, d_1, d_2)$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  checks whether  $\psi$  is equal to  $\psi^*$  or not. If  $\psi = \psi^*$ , then  $\mathcal{S}$  puts  $K = \perp$ . Otherwise,  $\mathcal{S}$  computes  $\tau \leftarrow H_\mu(h)$  and verifies whether  $\psi = (h, d_1, d_2)$  is consistent or not (call this case CONSISTENCY-CHECK). That is,  $\mathcal{S}$  verifies whether  $(g, X_1^\tau W_1, X_2^\tau W_2, h, d_1, d_2)$  is a twin DH tuple as follows. Put  $\widehat{Y} = h^{\tau-\tau^*}$ ,  $\widehat{Z}_1 = d_1/h^{u_1}$  and  $\widehat{Z}_2 = d_2/h^{u_2}$ . If  $\widehat{Z}_1^r \widehat{Z}_2 \neq \widehat{Y}^s$ , then it is not a twin DH tuple and  $\mathcal{S}$  puts  $K = \perp$ . Otherwise,  $\mathcal{S}$  decides that it is a twin DH tuple. Then, if  $\tau \neq \tau^*$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  computes  $K = \widehat{Z}_1^{1/(\tau-\tau^*)}$  (call this case SIMDEC). Otherwise ( $\tau = \tau^*$ ),  $\mathcal{S}$  aborts (call this case ABORT).  $\mathcal{S}$  replies  $K$  to  $\mathcal{A}$  except the case ABORT.

In case that  $\mathcal{A}$  replies  $\widehat{K}^*$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  computes  $Z = \widehat{K}^*/X^{a^*}$  and returns  $Z$ .

Given  $q, g, X = g^x, Y = g^y$  as input;

**Initial Setting**

- Initialize the inner state
- $a^* \leftarrow \mathbf{Z}_q, h^* := Yg^{a^*}$
- $\mu \leftarrow Hkey(1^k), \tau^* \leftarrow H_\mu(h^*)$
- $r, s \leftarrow \mathbf{Z}_q, X_1 := X, X_2 := X_1^{-r}g^s$
- $u_1, u_2 \leftarrow \mathbf{Z}_q, W_1 := X_1^{-\tau^*}g^{u_1}, W_2 := X_2^{-\tau^*}g^{u_2}$
- $d_1^* := (h^*)^{u_1}, d_2^* := (h^*)^{u_2}$
- $\mathbf{pk} := (g, X, X_1, X_2, W_1, W_2, \mu), \psi^* := (h^*, d_1^*, d_2^*)$
- Invoke  $\mathcal{A}$  on  $\mathbf{pk}$  and  $\psi^*$

**Answering  $\mathcal{A}$ 's Queries**

- In case that  $\mathcal{A}$  queries  $\mathcal{DEC}(\mathbf{sk}, \cdot)$  for the answer for  $\psi = (h, d_1, d_2)$ 
  - If  $\psi = \psi^*$ , then put  $K := \perp$
  - else (: the case CONSISTENCY-CHECK)
    - $\tau \leftarrow H_\mu(h), \widehat{Y} := h^{\tau-\tau^*}, \widehat{Z}_1 := d_1/h^{u_1}, \widehat{Z}_2 := d_2/h^{u_2}$
    - If  $\widehat{Z}_1^r \widehat{Z}_2 \neq \widehat{Y}^s$ , then  $K := \perp$
    - else
      - If  $\tau \neq \tau^*$ , then  $K := \widehat{Z}_1^{1/(\tau-\tau^*)}$  (: the case SIMDEC)
      - else abort (: the case ABORT)
  - Reply  $K$  to  $\mathcal{A}$
- In case that  $\mathcal{A}$  replies  $\widehat{K}^*$  as the answer for  $\psi^*$ 
  - $Z := \widehat{K}^*/X^{a^*}$
  - Return  $Z$

**Fig. 4.** A CDH problem solver  $\mathcal{S}$  employing a one-way-CCA adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  for the proof of Theorem 2.

$\mathcal{S}$  is able to simulate the real view of  $\mathcal{A}$  perfectly until the case ABORT happens except a negligible case, as we see below.

Firstly, the challenge ciphertext  $\psi^* = (h^*, d_1^*, d_2^*)$  is consistent and correctly distributed. This is because the distribution of  $(h^*, d_1^*, d_2^*)$  is equal to that of the real consistent ciphertext  $\psi = (h, d_1, d_2)$ . To see it, note that  $y + a^*$  is substituted for  $a$ :

$$h^* = g^{y+a^*}, d_i^* = (g^{y+a^*})^{u_i} = (g^{u_i})^{y+a^*} = (X_i^{\tau^*} W_i)^{y+a^*}, \quad i = 1, 2.$$

Secondly,  $\mathcal{S}$  simulates the decapsulation oracle  $\mathcal{DEC}(\mathbf{sk}, \cdot)$  perfectly except a negligible case. To see it, note that the consistency check really works though it may involve a negligible error case, which is explained by the following two claims.

**Claim 1**  $(g, X_1^\tau W_1, X_2^\tau W_2, h, d_1, d_2)$  is a twin DH tuple if and only if  $(g, X_1, X_2, \widehat{Y}, \widehat{Z}_1, \widehat{Z}_2)$  is a twin DH tuple for  $\widehat{Y} = h^{\tau-\tau^*}$ ,  $\widehat{Z}_1 = d_1/h^{u_1}$  and  $\widehat{Z}_2 = d_2/h^{u_2}$ . Claim 1 is proven by direct calculations and the proof is noted in Appendix B.

**Claim 2** If  $\widehat{Z}_1^r \widehat{Z}_2 = \widehat{Y}^s$  holds for  $\widehat{Y} = h^{\tau-\tau^*}$ ,  $\widehat{Z}_1 = d_1/h^{u_1}$  and  $\widehat{Z}_2 = d_2/h^{u_2}$ , then  $(g, X_1, X_2, \widehat{Y}, \widehat{Z}_1, \widehat{Z}_2)$  is a twin DH tuple except an error case that occurs at most  $1/q$  probability. Conversely, if  $(g, X_1, X_2, \widehat{Y}, \widehat{Z}_1, \widehat{Z}_2)$  is a twin DH tuple, then  $\widehat{Z}_1^r \widehat{Z}_2 = \widehat{Y}^s$  certainly holds.

*Proof of Claim 2.* We observe that each of  $\widehat{Y} = h^{\tau-\tau^*}$ ,  $\widehat{Z}_1 = d_1/h^{u_1}$  and  $\widehat{Z}_2 = d_2/h^{u_2}$  is given independently of  $r$ . So we can apply the Lemma in Section 2. (Q.E.D.)

Let us define the event OVERLOOK as:

$$\text{OVERLOOK} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} \widehat{Z}_1^r \widehat{Z}_2 = \widehat{Y}^s \text{ holds} \\ \text{and } (g, X_1, X_2, \widehat{Y}, \widehat{Z}_1, \widehat{Z}_2) \text{ is not a twin DH tuple.} \end{cases}$$

Then, by the Claim 2, the probability that OVERLOOK occurs is at most  $1/q$  for each consistency check. So for at most  $q_{dec}$  consistency checks, CONSISTENCY-CHECK $_i$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, q_{dec}$ , the probability that at least one corresponding OVERLOOK $_i$  occurs is at most  $q_{dec}/q$ . That is;

$$\Pr\left[\bigvee_{i=1}^{q_{dec}} \text{OVERLOOK}_i\right] \leq \frac{q_{dec}}{q}. \quad (2)$$

$q_{dec}$  is polynomial and  $q$  is exponential in  $k$ , so the right hand side is negligible in  $k$ .

Suppose  $\mathcal{S}$  has confirmed that a decapsulation query  $\psi = (h, d_1, d_2)$  passed the consistency check. In that case,  $(g, X_1^\tau W_1, X_2^\tau W_2, h, d_1, d_2)$  is a twin DH tuple (except a negligible case OVERLOOK), so  $d_1 = h^{\tau x_1 + w_1}$  holds. If, in addition,  $\mathcal{S}$  is in the case SIMDEC (that is,  $\tau \neq \tau^*$ ), then the answer  $K = \widehat{Z}_1^{1/(\tau-\tau^*)}$  of  $\mathcal{S}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$  is correct. This is because  $K = (d_1/h^{u_1})^{1/(\tau-\tau^*)}$  is equal to  $h^{x_1}$  by the following equality.

$$d_1/h^{u_1} = h^{\tau x_1 + w_1 - u_1} = h^{(\tau-\tau^*)x_1 + (\tau^*x_1 + w_1 - u_1)} = h^{(\tau-\tau^*)x_1},$$

where we use the equality (1).

As a whole,  $\mathcal{S}$  simulates the real view of  $\mathcal{A}$  perfectly until the case ABORT happens except the negligible case OVERLOOK.

Now we evaluate the advantage of  $\mathcal{S}$ . When  $\mathcal{A}$  wins,  $(g, X, h^*, \widehat{K}^*)$  is a DH tuple, so the following holds.

$$\widehat{K}^* = X^{y+a^*} = g^{x(y+a^*)} = g^{xy+xa^*}.$$

Hence the output  $Z$  is equal to  $\widehat{K}^*/X^{a^*} = g^{xy}$ , which is the correct answer for the input  $(g, X, Y)$ . That is,  $\mathcal{S}$  wins. Therefore, the probability that  $\mathcal{S}$  wins is lower bounded by

the probability that  $\mathcal{A}$  wins,  $\text{OVERLOOK}_i$  never occurs for  $i = 1, \dots, q_{dec}$  and  $\text{ABORT}$  does not happen:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\mathcal{S} \text{ wins}] &\geq \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins} \wedge (\bigwedge_{i=1}^{q_{dec}} (\neg \text{OVERLOOK}_i)) \wedge (\neg \text{ABORT})] \\ &\geq \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins}] - \Pr[(\bigvee_{i=1}^{q_{dec}} \text{OVERLOOK}_i) \vee \text{ABORT}] \\ &= \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins}] - (\Pr[\bigvee_{i=1}^{q_{dec}} \text{OVERLOOK}_i] + \Pr[(\bigwedge_{i=1}^{q_{dec}} (\neg \text{OVERLOOK}_i)) \wedge \text{ABORT}]). \end{aligned}$$

Using the inequality (2), we get:

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{S}, \text{Grp}}^{\text{cdh}}(k) \geq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{KEM1}}^{\text{ow-cca}}(k) - \frac{q_{dec}}{q} - \Pr[(\bigwedge_{i=1}^{q_{dec}} (\neg \text{OVERLOOK}_i)) \wedge \text{ABORT}].$$

So our task being left is to show the following inequality.

**Claim 3**  $\Pr[(\bigwedge_{i=1}^{q_{dec}} (\neg \text{OVERLOOK}_i)) \wedge \text{ABORT}] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{CF}, \text{Hfam}}^{\text{tcr}}(k).$

*Proof of Claim 3.* Using  $\mathcal{A}$  as subroutine, we construct a PPT target collision finder  $\mathcal{CF}$  on  $\text{Hfam}$  as follows. Given  $1^k$  as input,  $\mathcal{CF}$  initializes its inner state.  $\mathcal{CF}$  gets  $(q, g)$  from  $\text{Grp}(1^k)$ .  $\mathcal{CF}$  chooses  $a^* \in \mathbf{Z}_q$  at random, computes  $h^* = g^{a^*}$  and outputs  $h^*$ .  $\mathcal{CF}$  receives a random hash key  $\mu$  and computes  $\tau^* \leftarrow H_\mu(h^*)$ . Then  $\mathcal{CF}$  makes a secret key and public key honestly by itself:  $\mathbf{sk} = (q, g, x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, \mu)$ ,  $\mathbf{pk} = (q, g, X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2, \mu)$ . Finally,  $\mathcal{CF}$  computes  $d_1^* = (X_1^{\tau^*} Y_1)^{a^*}$ ,  $d_2^* = (X_2^{\tau^*} Y_2)^{a^*}$  and puts  $\psi^* = (h^*, d_1^*, d_2^*)$ .  $\mathcal{CF}$  invokes  $\mathcal{A}$  on  $\mathbf{pk}$  and  $\psi^*$ .

In case that  $\mathcal{A}$  queries the decapsulation oracle  $\mathcal{DEC}(\mathbf{sk}, \cdot)$  for the answer for  $\psi = (h, d_1, d_2)$ ,  $\mathcal{CF}$  checks whether  $\psi$  is equal to  $\psi^*$  or not. If  $\psi = \psi^*$ , then  $\mathcal{CF}$  replies  $K = \perp$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . Otherwise ( $\psi \neq \psi^*$ ),  $\mathcal{CF}$  computes  $\tau \leftarrow H_\mu(h)$  and verifies whether  $\psi = (h, d_1, d_2)$  is consistent.  $\mathcal{CF}$  can do it in the same way as the  $\text{Dec}$  does because  $\mathcal{CF}$  has the secret key  $\mathbf{sk}$ . If it is not consistent,  $\mathcal{CF}$  replies  $K = \perp$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . Otherwise, if  $\tau \neq \tau^*$ , then  $\mathcal{CF}$  replies  $K = h^{x_1}$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . Else if  $\tau = \tau^*$ , then  $\mathcal{CF}$  returns  $h$  and stops (call this case  $\text{COLLISION}$ ).

The view of  $\mathcal{A}$  in  $\mathcal{CF}$  is the same as the real view until the case  $\text{COLLISION}$  happens.

Observe here the following. If  $\text{OVERLOOK}$  never occurs in  $\mathcal{S}$ , then only consistent queries ( $\psi$ 's) have the chance to make a collision  $\tau = \tau^*$ , which is unconditionally holds in  $\mathcal{CF}$ . Hence we have:

$$\Pr[(\bigwedge_{i=1}^{q_{dec}} (\neg \text{OVERLOOK}_i)) \wedge \text{ABORT}] \leq \Pr[\text{COLLISION}]. \quad (3)$$

On the other hand, notice that  $\text{COLLISION}$  implies the following.

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (g, X_1^{\tau^*} Y_1, X_2^{\tau^*} Y_2, h^*, d_1^*, d_2^*): \text{ a twin DH tuple} \\ \text{and } \exists (g, X_1^\tau Y_1, X_2^\tau Y_2, h, d_1, d_2): \text{ a twin DH tuple} \\ \text{and } \tau = \tau^*. \end{array} \right.$$

If, in addition to the above conditions,  $h$  were equal to  $h^*$ , then  $(d_1, d_2)$  would be equal to  $(d_1^*, d_2^*)$ . This means that  $\psi$  is equal to  $\psi^*$ , a contradiction. So it must hold that

$$h \neq h^*.$$

Namely, in the case COLLISION,  $\mathcal{CF}$  succeeds in making a target collision:

$$\Pr[\text{COLLISION}] = \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{CF}, \text{Hfam}}^{\text{tcr}}(k). \quad (4)$$

Combining (3) and (4), we get the inequality as claimed. (Q.E.D.)

### 4.3 A Tuning for Efficiency and the Corresponding Identification Scheme

To reduce the length of ciphertext  $\psi = (h, d_1, d_2)$ , we can replace the term  $d_2$  with its hash value  $v_2 := H_\mu(d_2)$ . Let us call this KEM KEM2. In KEM2, the ciphertext turns to  $\psi = (h, d_1, v_2)$ , so the consistency check for index 2 in  $\text{Dec}(\mathbf{sk}, \psi)$  becomes  $H_\mu(h^{\tau x_2 + y_2}) \stackrel{?}{=} v_2$ . In addition, the trapdoor test in the security proof,  $\widehat{Z}_1^r \widehat{Z}_2 \stackrel{?}{=} \widehat{Y}^s$ , is deformed as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{Z}_1^r \widehat{Z}_2 = \widehat{Y}^s &\iff (d_1/h^{u_1})^r (d_2/h^{u_2}) = (h^{\tau - \tau^*})^s \\ &\iff d_1^{-r} h^{ru_1 + u_2 + s(\tau - \tau^*)} = d_2 \\ &\implies H_\mu(d_1^{-r} h^{ru_1 + u_2 + s(\tau - \tau^*)}) = v_2. \end{aligned}$$

The last equality may cause collision, so the security statement for KEM2 needs the collision resistance assumption of employed hash function  $H_\mu$  (the name of game ‘‘cr’’ in  $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{CF}', \text{Hfam}}^{\text{cr}}(k)$  below means collision resistance).

**Corollary of Theorem 2** *The key encapsulation mechanism KEM2 is one-way-CCA secure based on the CDH assumption, the target collision resistance and the collision resistance of employed hash function. More precisely, for any PPT one-way-CCA adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  on KEM2 that queries decapsulation oracle at most  $q_{\text{dec}}$  times, there exist a PPT CDH problem solver  $\mathcal{S}$  on  $\text{Grp}$ , a PPT collision-finder  $\mathcal{CF}$  and  $\mathcal{CF}'$  on  $\text{Hfam}$  which satisfy the following tight reduction.*

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{KEM2}}^{\text{ow-cca}}(k) \leq \frac{q_{\text{dec}}}{q} + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{S}, \text{Grp}}^{\text{cdh}}(k) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{CF}, \text{Hfam}}^{\text{tcr}}(k) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{CF}', \text{Hfam}}^{\text{cr}}(k).$$

The ID scheme derived from KEM2 is shown in the Fig.5. The maximum message length of the ID scheme derived from KEM1 (that is, the length of challenge message of  $\mathbf{V}$ ) amounts to three elements in  $\text{Grp}$ . By the tuning above, the maximum message length reduces to two elements in  $\text{Grp}$  plus one hash value of  $H_\mu$ .

## 5 Efficiency Comparison

In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of our ID schemes comparing with other ID schemes secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks in the standard model.

<p><b>Key Generation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- K: given <math>1^k</math> as input; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <math>(g, g) \leftarrow \text{Grp}(1^k), \mu \leftarrow \text{Hkey}(1^k)</math></li> <li>• <math>x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2 \leftarrow \mathbf{Z}_q, X_1 := g^{x_1}, X_2 := g^{x_2}, Y_1 := g^{y_1}, Y_2 := g^{y_2}</math></li> <li>• <math>\text{pk} := (g, g, X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2, \mu), \text{sk} := (q, g, x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, \mu)</math></li> <li>• Return <math>(\text{pk}, \text{sk})</math></li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b>Interaction</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- V: given <math>\text{pk}</math> as input; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <math>a \leftarrow \mathbf{Z}_q, h := g^a, \tau \leftarrow H_\mu(h)</math></li> <li>• <math>d_1 := (X_1^\tau Y_1)^a, v_2 := H_\mu((X_2^\tau Y_2)^a), K := X_1^a, \psi = (h, d_1, v_2)</math></li> <li>• Send <math>\psi</math> to P</li> </ul> </li> <li>- P: given <math>\text{sk}</math> as input and receiving <math>\psi = (h, d_1, v_2)</math> as input message; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <math>\tau \leftarrow H_\mu(h)</math></li> <li>• If <math>h^{\tau x_1 + y_1} \neq d_1</math> or <math>H_\mu(h^{\tau x_2 + y_2}) \neq v_2</math> then <math>\widehat{K} := \perp</math> else <math>\widehat{K} := h^{x_1}</math></li> <li>• Send <math>\widehat{K}</math> to V</li> </ul> </li> <li>- V: receiving <math>\widehat{K}</math> as input message; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If <math>\widehat{K} = K</math> then return 1 else return 0</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
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**Fig. 5.** An ID scheme derived from KEM2.

Under the condition that security is based on the CDH assumption, our ID schemes reduce the computation by one exponentiation than the currently most efficient one.

Comparable schemes are divided into four categories. The first category is  $\Sigma$ -protocols, the second category is challenge-and-response ID schemes obtained from EUF-CMA secure signature schemes, the third category is the ones obtained from IND-CCA secure encryption schemes and the fourth category is the ones obtained from one-way-CCA secure KEMs.

In the first category, to the best of our knowledge, the Gennaro scheme is the most efficient but is no more efficient than the ID scheme derived from Cramer-Shoup encryption [8, 25, 9] (the Cramer-Shoup ID scheme, for short). As for the second category, all the known signature schemes in the standard model, including the Short Signature [2] and the Waters Signature [26], are costly than the Cramer-Shoup ID scheme.

In the third category, the Cramer-Shoup ID scheme is the most efficient. Note that the Cramer-Shoup KEM [25, 9] (Sh00KEM) is also usable as an ID scheme, because the KEM is IND-CCA secure and hence one-way-CCA secure. On the contrary, we remark that the KEM part of Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption scheme [19] is not comparable because the KEM is not one-way-CCA secure [14].

In the fourth category the one-way-CCA secure KEM of Hanaoka-Kurosawa [15] (HK08KEM) is vary comparable, as its security is reduced to the CDH assumption. A recently proposed ID scheme of Anada-Arita [1] is also comparable as it can be considered an ID scheme derived from one-way-CCA secure KEM (AA10KEM)<sup>2</sup>.

Table 1 shows comparison of these KEMs with our KEMs KEM1 and KEM2. In the table, we are comparing computational amount by counting the number of exponentiation. We also compares the maximum message length. (For the DDH assumption and the Gap-CDH assumption, see [21].)

<sup>2</sup> We note that one-time signature in the ID scheme of [1] can be replaced by TCR hash function.

**Table 1.** Efficiency comparison of KEM1 and KEM2 with previous KEMs.  $G$  and  $h$  mean an element in  $G_q$  and a hash value in  $\mathbf{Z}_q$ , respectively. OW-CCA means one-way-CCA security.

KEM	Security Assump.	Security as KEM	Security as ID scm.	Exponentiation		Max. Msg. Length (Challenge Msg.)
				V(Enc)	P(Dec)	
Sh00KEM	DDH	IND-CCA	cMiM	5	3	$3G$
HK08KEM	CDH	OW-CCA	cMiM	7	3	$3G$
AA10KEM	Gap-CDH	OW-CCA	cMiM	4	2	$2G$
Our KEM1	CDH	OW-CCA	cMiM	6	3	$3G$
Our KEM2	CDH	OW-CCA	cMiM	6	3	$2G + 1h$

As shown in Table 1, the ID schemes derived from KEM1 and KEM2 reduce the computation by one exponentiation for verifier than the currently most efficient one derived from the Hanaoka-Kurosawa one-way-CCA secure KEM [15], whose security is based on the same (CDH) assumption, which is the weakest in the three assumptions in the table. We can also look at the table as a trade off between strength of security assumptions and computational amounts to execute protocols.

## 6 Conclusion

We showed a generic way for deriving a cMiM secure ID scheme from a one-way-CCA secure KEM. Then we gave a concrete one-way-CCA secure KEM utilizing the Twin Diffie-Hellman technique. The obtained ID scheme performs better than the currently most efficient one whose security is based on the (same) CDH assumption.

## Acknowledgements

We appreciate sincere suggestions offered by Prof. Kiltz [18] and we would like to thank Prof. Kurosawa for inspiring words, both at ProvSec 2010. We also thank anonymous reviewers for careful reading and valuable comments.

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# Appendix

## A Target Collision Resistant Hash Functions

Target collision resistant (TCR) hash functions [20, 23] are treated as a family. Let us denote a function family as  $Hfam(1^k) = \{H_\mu\}_{\mu \in Hkey(1^k)}$ . Here  $Hkey(1^k)$  is a hash key space,  $\mu \in Hkey(1^k)$  is a hash key and  $H_\mu$  is a function from  $\{0, 1\}^*$  to  $\{0, 1\}^k$ . We may assume that  $H_\mu$  is from  $\{0, 1\}^*$  to  $\mathbf{Z}_q$ , where  $q$  is a prime of length  $k$ .

Given a PPT algorithm  $\mathcal{CF}$ , a collision finder, we consider the following experiment.

**Experiment** $_{\mathcal{CF}, Hfam}^{\text{tcr}}(1^k)$

$m \leftarrow \mathcal{CF}(1^k), \mu \leftarrow Hkey(1^k), m' \leftarrow \mathcal{CF}(\mu)$

If  $H_\mu(m) = H_\mu(m')$  and  $m \neq m'$ , then return WIN else return LOSE.

We define  $\mathcal{CF}$ 's advantage over  $Hfam$  in the game of target collision resistance as follows.

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{CF}, Hfam}^{\text{tcr}}(k) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[\mathbf{Experiment}_{\mathcal{CF}, Hfam}^{\text{tcr}}(1^k) \text{ returns WIN}].$$

We say that  $Hfam$  is a TCR function family if, for any PPT algorithm  $\mathcal{CF}$ ,  $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{CF}, Hfam}^{\text{tcr}}(k)$  is negligible in  $k$ .

In theory, TCR hash function families can be constructed based on the existence of a one-way function [20, 23].

## B Proof of Claim 1

Assume that  $(g, X_1^\tau W_1, X_2^\tau W_2, h, d_1, d_2)$  is a twin DH tuple and put

$$X_i^\tau W_i =: g^{\alpha_i}, h =: g^\beta, d_i =: g^{\alpha_i \beta}, \quad i = 1, 2.$$

Then  $h^{\tau-\tau^*} = g^{\beta(\tau-\tau^*)}$ . Note that we have set

$$W_i := X_i^{-\tau^*} g^{u_i}, \quad i = 1, 2.$$

So  $X_i^\tau W_i = X_i^\tau X_i^{-\tau^*} g^{u_i} = X_i^{\tau-\tau^*} g^{u_i}$  and we have

$$g^{\alpha_i - u_i} = X_i^{\tau-\tau^*}, \quad i = 1, 2.$$

Hence

$$d_i/h^{u_i} = g^{\alpha_i \beta} / g^{\beta u_i} = g^{(\alpha_i - u_i)\beta} = X_i^{\beta(\tau-\tau^*)}, \quad i = 1, 2.$$

This means  $(g, X_1, X_2, \widehat{Y}, \widehat{Z}_1, \widehat{Z}_2)$  is a twin DH tuple for  $\widehat{Y} = h^{\tau-\tau^*}$ ,  $\widehat{Z}_1 = d_1/h^{u_1}$  and  $\widehat{Z}_2 = d_2/h^{u_2}$ .

The converse is also verified by setting the goal to be  $d_i = g^{\alpha_i \beta}$ ,  $i = 1, 2$  and starting from the assumption that  $\widehat{Z}_i = d_i/h^{u_i} = X_i^{\beta(\tau-\tau^*)}$ ,  $i = 1, 2$ . (Q.E.D.)